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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume LIII December, 1950 Number 1
A DECADE OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
LEo CARLIN*
T HIS review deals with statutes, rules of court, and cases, relating
to pleading, practice and procedure in West Virginia, enacted,
promulgated or decided approximately within the last decade. It
had its genesis in what may be described as a digest prepared at
the end of the late war for distribution in mimeographic form to
returning veterans, to aid them in acquiring a knowledge of legal
events that had occurred in their absence. Inquiries about the
resume and demands for copies have indicated that it has generated
an interest broader than its distribution. Consequently, it is sur-
mised that a sufficient number may be interested to warrant its
publication; particularly if, as is attempted here, it is supplemented
by including subsequent items so as approximately to round out
the decade.
The material for discussion has been suggested by citations,
which the writer has made from time to time and preserved, of
statutes, rules and decisions which are understood to have made
more or less fundamental additions to, or changes in, the local law.
No attempt has been made to review numerous additional cases
decided within the decade which are merely corroborative of rules
already established. The number and variety of the items have
forbidden any attempt at comprehensive or formal discussion.
Citation of authorities has been limited, particularly of authori-
ties to sustain familiar and fundamental propositions of law or
propositions only collaterally involved.
For purposes of convenience and to facilitate reference, the
material has been (to a degree arbitrarily) allocated to the follow-
ing topics: Process; Remedies; Common Law Pleading; Common
Law Practice and Procedure; Equity Pleading and Procedure;
Motions; Garnishment; Court Rules. To a certain extent, these
Professor of law, West Virginia University.
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topics overlap. Some of the court rules could have been allocated
wholly to some one of the preceding topics; but others, dealing
with the subject matter of more than one topic, could not logically
be so confined. Consequently, it was deemed advisable to deal
with them as a whole in an independent topic, rather than under-
take to dissect them for purposes of distribution.
PROCESS
Legal status of praecipe book. A section in the Code provides
that process to commence a suit "shall be issued on the order of
the plaintiff, his attorney or agent."' This order is what is fa-
miliarly known as a praecipe or precipe. The statute is silent
as to its form. So far as the statute is concerned, it might be oral;
although the writer has never observed an instance of delivery, or
attempted delivery, of an oral praecipe, and reasons may be sug-
gested why it ought to be in writing. A writing serves the con-
venience of the clerk and, since the praecipe should contain all
the data necessary for issuance of process in a particular case, pro-
tects him against a charge of having issued process contrary to di-
rections. However, the writer has always assumed that a written
praecipe is intended for the use and convenience of the clerk, and
in a sense is his private paper. Wherefore, it should not constitute
a record in the case nor in any way be the subject of review be-
cause of anything that it may or may not contain. In accord with
these concepts, the Supreme Court of Appeals, in State ex rel.
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Van Hunter,2 holds that a praecipe
book is not a record of the court and therefore is not open to pub-
lic inspection under the statute3 making court records subject to
public inspection. The court says, by way of dictum, that a mere
oral order to the clerk to issue process would be sufficient.
What constitutes issuance of process. It has been familiar law
in this state that, by statute, an action or suit is started when process
is issued;4 but it seems that until recently no case has definitely
indicated what act constitutes issuance of process. The West Vir-
ginia cases have held that the date of the process is prima facie the
date of its issuance,- but of course fixing the time of the act does
not determine its nature. One view is that the process is issued
I W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 3, § 4 (1931).
2 127 W. Va. 738, 34 S.E.2d 468 (1945).
3 W. VA. CODE c. 51, art. 4, § 2 (1931).
4 United States Blowpipe Co. v. Spencer, 46 W. Va. 590, 33 S.E. 342 (1899).
5 Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Chewning, 52 W. Va. 523, 44 S.E. 193 (1903).
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when all the blanks have been filled in and it has been signed by
the clerk, although it remains in the clerk's office. A contrary view
is that process is not issued until it has gone out of the clerk's
office for service, a view based largely on the etymology of the word
"issue." The controversy was finally resolved in Virginia by enact-
ment of a statute.7 There is no statute in West Virginia defining
issuance, but a recent case apparently has definitely prescribed a
rule in the following language:
"Process is not issued until the summons is sent from the
clerk's office under his direction, sanction and authority for
the purpose of service."
Cases from other jurisdictions are cited for this proposition, but
no West Virginia case.
The consequences of this rule are involved in many important
phases of procedure. There are many reasons why it is vital to
know when an action or suit has been started. For instance,
starting an action stops the running of the statute of limitations;
brings into operation the principle of lis pendens; warrants the
issuance of an attachment. In order to accomplish any of these
objects, either at law or in equity, it would not now seem sufficient
to have the process filled in, signed by the clerk and then left in
his office (for instance, because the defendant is a nonresident and
there is no expectation of service), as has been the practice in some
jurisdictions in the past; but the process must go out of the clerk's
office, if not for an attempted service, at least in order 'to comply
with a formality.
Service of process on auditor or secretary of state. The same
case which defines issuance of process9 contains an adjudication
which prompted revision in 194510 of a section in the Code." This
section provided for service on the auditor of the state as attorney
in fact for a corporation. The instant case holds that, when suit
is brought against a corporation to collect a debt (license tax)
which it is the duty of the auditor to collect, the auditor is dis-
qualified to accept service of process on behalf of the corporation.
Presumably as a result of this decision, the section cited was
6 See BuIKs, PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE 400 (1913).
7 "It shall not be deemed to have been issued until delivered or placed in
the course of delivery to some officer or other person to be executed." VA. CODE
§ 6061 (1986).
S Nicholas Land Co. v. Crowder, 127 W. Va. 216, 222, 82 S.E.2d. 568, 567
(1944).
9 Ibid.
10 W. Va. Acts 1945, c. 24.
21 W. VA. CODE c. 31, art. 1, § 71 (1931).
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amended by adding thereto a paragraph to the effect that in such
cases the secretary of state, in lieu of the auditor, is constituted
attorney in fact for the corporation.
Time when alias process must issue. There is a conflict in the
decisions of the various jurisdictions as to the time when an alias
process must issue with reference to the return day of the original.12
Some courts hold to a strict rule that there must be no time interval,
or hiatus, as it is frequently called, between the return day of the
original and the issuance of the alias, which in this state would
mean that the alias must issue not later than the rule day to which
the original is returnable. Other courts disregard the hiatus, per-
mitting postponement of issuance of the alias until a time when
there will be some utility in its issuance, e.g., when there is an
opportunity for service. The West Virginia cases have indicated a
preference for what may be described as a liberalized version of
the hiatus rule. For instance, in Dunaway v. Lord,"' it is suggested
that the alias might follow the original within "a reasonable time;"
but not until some time later was a criterion prescribed by which
the reasonable time might be determined. In Vogler v. Ireland,'4
the court seems to have indicated definitely what is meant by a
reasonable time. The rule is stated as follows:
"When an original process has been returned unexecuted,
an uninterrupted succession of writs is not required to main-
tain the existence of the writ, but only that no succeeding
rules shall pass without process returnable or outstanding."'"
Hence it is not necessary in this state that, in conformity with
the strict rule, the alias issue on the return day of the original; but
it must issue not later than the succeeding rules thereafter, which
is what occurred in the Vogler case. Presumably, the same rule
would apply in determining when a pluries must issue with refer-
ence to an alias or a pluries.
Waiver by appearance after objection to process. It is familiar
law that defects in process or the service thereof are waived by a
general appearance to the case without objection, e.g, by pleading
to the merits; but there is a split of authority as to whether, after
proper objections to such defects have been interposed and over-
ruled and exceptions saved, the defects and objections are waived
12 See 50 C.J. 465 (1930); Bums, PLEADING AND PRAc'IcE 290 et seq.
13 114 W. Va. 671, 173 S.E. 568 (1934).
14 122 W. Va. 477, 10 S.E.2d 792 (1940).
15 Syl.
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by a general appearance thereafter."6 The West Virginia cases have
not been entirely harmonious on this proposition. In Chesapeake
& Ohio R.R. v. Wright,"7 the court seemingly held that there was
a waiver. In a later case, Fisher v. Crowley,"' the court definitely
held that there was no waiver by appearance and submission to
trial on the merits after the objection had been interposed and
overruled and exception saved. This case apparently, in effect,
overrules the Wright case, although an attempt is made to dis-
tinguish it. As late as 1940, Fisher v. Crowley was definitely
approved, by way of dictum, in Hall v. Ocean Accident 8 Guarantee
Corp.0 However, only four years later, in Stone v. Rudolph,'20
Fisher v. Crowley is in effect overruled, with the following state-
ment of the rule:
"An alleged defect in the service of process, raised by a
motion to quash a return of service thereof, is waived by a sub-
sequent general appearance in a suit or action."21
Fisher v. Crowley is not mentioned in the opinion and the court
goes back to the Wright case, first above cited, which Fisher v.
C owley apparently overruled, as authority for its holding.
Impeachment of return of service of process. The courts are
not in accord as to whether the truth of an officer's return of service
of process may be impeached.2- 2 What is supposed to be the liberal
and modern rule, prevailing in many jurisdictions, permits impeach-
ment.2 In other jurisdictions, the so-called verity rule prevails and
the return cannot be impeached. A litigant suffering detriment
from a false return ordinarily must submit to a judgment based
thereon and seek retribution against the officer making the false
return and his bondsmen. In the earlier cases, the West Virginia
court adhered to the verity rule.24 In 1921, in a suit in equity
attacking a return in a common law action, the court definitely,
and seemingly unqualifiedly, repudiated the verity rule. -5 Later
cases, however, seem to display a repentant attitude toward the
16 Syl.
17 50 W. Va. 653, 41 S.E. 147 (1902).
is Fisher v. Crowley, 57 W. Va. 312, 50 S.E. 422 (1905).
if 122 V. Va. 188, 9 S.E.2d 45 (1940).
20 127 V. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944).
-1 Syl. 2.
Z' 42 AM. JuR. 110 et seq. (1942).
'3 See Sunderland, The Sheriff's Return, 16 CoL. L. RFv. 281 (1916).
-4 See McClung v. McWhorter, 47 W. Va. 150, 34 S.E. 740 (1899); R.D.
Johnson Milling Co. v. Read, 76 W. Va. 557, 85 S.E. 726 (1915).
5 Nuttallburg Smokeless Fuel Co. v. First National Bank, 89 W. Va. 438,
109 S.E. 766 (1921).
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repudiation. Attempts were made to narrow the effect of the deci-
sion adopting the new rule. On the whole, it might have been
surmised that the court was finally going to take the attitude that
the return could be attacked only in equity, as has been held in
some jurisdictions. 6 However, in a late case, 27 the court has taken
an inventory of its earlier decisions and, with two judges dissenting,
has wholly repudiated the verity rule, permitting the return to be
attacked by a plea in abatement.
Craving oyer of a writ. In McKinley v. Queen,28 decided in
1943, the court held, in accord with other authorities, that a writ
in chancery is per se a part of the record. At the same time, by way
of dictum, it took occasion to express dissatisfaction with the rule
that oyer is necessary to make a common law writ a part of the
record:
"In view of the provisions of Code, 56-3-4 and 58-5-7, no
reason is perceived why a writ commencing an action at law
should not be considered a part of the record without oyer,
but that question is not before us."129
It might have been surmised from this statement that, when the
question did come before the court for decision, it would decide
that the rule requiring oyer should be abandoned, if not as archaic
and useless, yet as impliedly dispensed with by statute. However,
in a case decided four years later, appears the following statement:
"Here the petition fails to allege that the process under
attack was made a part of the record. That could have been
done in an action at law only by craving oyer of the writ and
return.". 0
It remained for the Legislature, in 1949, to provide that a writ,
whether at law or in equity, shall be a part of the record without
the formality of craving oyer31 So it will no longer be necessary
to crave oyer of a writ in order to make a motion to quash or plead
in abatement.
REMEDIES
Limitation of actions. The Legislature at its last session seems
tc. have taken a critical glance at the time periods prescribed by
2V See Looney v. West Virginia Hardwood Co., 113 W. Va. 385, 168 S.E.
138 (1933); Lanham v. Home Auto Co., 115 W. Va. 415, 176 S.E. 604 (1934).
27 Swartzwelder v. Freeport Coal Co., 131 W. Va. 276, 46 S.E.2d 813 (1948).
's 125 W. Va. 619, 25 S.E.2d 763 (1943).
29 Id. at 623, 25 S.E.2d at 765.
30 State ex rel. Godby v. Chambers, 130 W. Va. 115, 117, 42 S.E.2d 255, 257
(1947).
31 W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 96, adding section 32 to art. 3, c. 56, W. VA. CODE.
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statutes of limitation. One period was extended and another
reduced.
For some years a section in the Code has placed an unqualified
limitation of twenty years on enforcement of a vendor's lien, mort-
gage or deed of trust covering realty.32 This section was amended
so as to provide for renewal of the twenty-year period by filing an
affidavit showing an unpaid balance of the debt secured or interest
thereon.3
3
Another section in the Code, of long standing, 4 has, in effect,
placed a limitation of five years on an action on a tort claim that
survives the death of a party. This section was amended so as to
reduce the period from five to two years.35
Causes of action and elements of damage distinguished. The
courts have had no little difficulty in dealing with problems which
arise when more rights than one of the same person are simul-
taneously invaded by a single tortious act. These problems most
frequently arise when somebody suffers an injury to himself and
damage to his property by the same tortious act.36 The funda-
mental inquiry in such a case, upon an answer to which solution of
the difficulties depends, is whether the two detriments constitute
separate causes of action or merely different elements of damage
from a single cause of action. A proper appraisal of the situation
is particularly important in these days when so many persons simul-
taneously suffer personal injury and property damage in automo-
bile accidents. It is also important because many fundamental
rights depend upon the theory adopted. For instance, is it proper
to declare upon both items of recovery in a single count in a
declaration? 7 Or, if a party in his original declaration declares
only for the personal injury, can he amend by way of adding a
claim for damages to his automobile (or vice versa), or would such
an amendment violate the rule that an amendment cannot be made
which would change the cause of action?"s Or, if a plaintiff declares
upon one of these matters alone and obtains a judgment, will the
32 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 2, § 5 (1931).
33 W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 1.
34 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 2, § 12 (1931).
.- W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 2.
38 They can arise in other situations, as when a person suffers a violation
of his absolute and his relative rights by the same tortious act. An instance
is where a husband sues for injuries to himself and to his wife. See Devino
v. Central Vermont R.R., 63 Vt. 98 (1890).
37 See Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 160 S.E. 303 (1931).
38 See Larzo v. Swift : Co., 129 W. Va. 436, 40 S.E.2d 811 (1946).
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judgment constitute res judicata as to the other matter, on the
principle that one cannot split his cause of action, suing upon part
of it at one time and on the other part at a subsequent time and
in a different action?39 The answer to each of these questions
depends upon whether the two items constitute separate causes of
action or only one cause of action with two elements of damage.
The authorities are not in accord as to the proper theory.
One view is that there is only one cause of action, the concept
being that the defendant's act of negligence is what constitutes the
cause of action and that the personal injury and the property dam-
age are merely separate items of damage resulting from the negli-
gence.40 In opposition to the concept upon which this view is based,
ir is urged that no cause of action can arise from a mere act of
negligence unless an injury or damage results therefrom; in other
words, that it takes both the negligence and the consequences to
constitute a cause of action, this being an instance where damage
i; of the gist, and therefore an element, of the cause of action. 41
This being true, it results that whether there is only one cause of
action or several causes of action as a result of the negligence will
depend upon whether more ingredients than one have been added
to the negligence. To resort to analogy, hydrogen alone is just
hydrogen; but hydrogen plus oxygen becomes water and hydrogen
plus nitrogen becomes ammonia. Hydrogen is in both compounds,
but they are radically different substances with radically different
properties. Moreover, aside from pure legal theory, it is argued
that the difficulties involved in the practical application of the
theory of a single cause of action are sufficient to demonstrate its
invalidity. These difficulties have been fairly well summarized in
a late West Virginia case as they might arise under the West
Virginia law as it was then.
"The period of limitation of action for personal injury is
shorter than the period for injury to property; the former dies
with the person unless the injury caused death, the latter does
not; the former is non-assignable, the latter is assignable; the
former does not pass to the trustee of a bankrupt for the benefit
of his creditors, the latter does; if the personal injury produces
death the damages recovered by reason thereof are, under the
express terms of the statute, conserved for the distributees of
39 See 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 740 (2d ed. 1902).
40 Devino v. Central Vermont R.R., 63 Vt. 98 (1890). It may be pertinent
to inquire how this theory would solve the problem if the tortious act were
willfully committed.
41 1 AM. JuR. 494-6 (1936).
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the deceased, while recovery for the property damage would go
to his estate primarily for the benefit of creditors."4 2-
In the case from which the statements above are quoted, the ques-
tion was whether the plaintiff could properly seek, in a single count,
recovery for injury to himself and damage to his automobile caused
by a single tortious act. The court's reasoning, as indicated in the
statements quoted above, and the language used when referring to
the different items, would seem to indicate that the court under-
stood that they constituted separate causes of action. However, the
decision is inconclusive, since the court reasons that, nobody having
died, the property claim not having been assigned, and neither
claim having been barred by statute, no harm was done by joining
them in a single count.43 In a later case, Larzo v. Swift &c Co.,44 any
doubt about the attitude which the court was finally to take seems
to have been definitely settled.
In that case, the plaintiff declared for personal injuries. She
later asked leave to amend by way of adding a claim for damages
to her automobile. Objection was interposed on the ground that
she was seeking to introduce a new cause of action. In its ruling
on this point, the court says:
"A plaintiff who has sustained personal injuries and
property damage in an automobile collision has but a single
cause of action and the elements of damages, consisting of
injury to the person and property of the plaintiff, must be
joined in the same action . . . .The cause of action is the
negligent act and not the resulting damages.."4 5
COMMON LAW PLEADING
Parties; nonjoinder of joint tort-feasors. It is fundamental law
that, in the absence of statute, joint tort-feasors may be sued severally
or any number of them may be sued jointly, at the option of the
plaintiff; and if fewer than all are sued, no objection can avail as
to the nonjoinder. A section in the Code, enacted for the first time
in 1931, provides as follows:
42 Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 68, 160 S.E. 303, 804 (1931). See
also 1 Am. JuR. 494-6 (1936).
43 It may be pertinent to inquire why the court was so much concerned
about whether the two items constituted two causes of action. In West Vir-
ginia the joinder of two causes of action in a single count, although not a
commendable practice, is considered a formal defect and therefore not a
reversible error. See 40 W. VA. L.Q. 241 (1984).
+- 129 W. Va. 436, 40 S.E.2d 811 (1946).
4r Id. ut 442, 40 S.E.2d at 814.
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"Whenever in any case full justice cannot be done and a
complete and final determination of the controversy cannot be
had without the presence of other parties, and such nonjoinder
shall be made to appear by affidavit or otherwise at any time
before final judgment or decree, the court of its own accord,
or upon motion, may cause such omitted persons to be made
parties to the action or suit, by proper amendment and process,
at any stage of the cause, as the ends of justice may require,
and upon such terms as may appear to the court to be just
"46
In Rouse v. Eagle Convex Glass Specialty Co.,47 it was con-
tended that this statute changed the common law rule stated above
and that the trial court should have granted an application to
bring a nonjoined joint tort-feasor into a personal injury action.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, ruling against the contention,
made the -following statement:
"Code, 56-4-34, provides that whenever it shall appear in
a case that full justice cannot be done and final determination
of the controversy be had without the presence of others, they
may be made parties by the court upon motion. This provi-
sion is construed not to apply to the motion of a defendant in
a tort action to have an alleged joint tort-feasor made a party."48
Parties; refusal of coplaintiff to sue. In Vinson v. Home
Insurance Co.,49 the court dealt with the problem of what to do
when one who should sue as a joint plaintiff in a common law action
refuses to engage in the litigation. The court reached the conclu-
sion that, since the unwilling party could not be made a defendant
in the common law action, the only alternative for the party who
desired to sue was to abandon his common law action and sue in
equity, where the unwilling party could be made a defendant,
expressing its conclusion in the following language:
"... But under the allegations of the declaration, Universal
Credit Company stands on demurrer as declining to permit its
name to be used as a party plaintiff. Since no interest in com-
mon with the insurance company requires that it be made a
defendant, but to the contrary, its interests appear to conflict
with those of that company and there is no manner in which
process can issue against a plaintiff commanding it to appear, it
would seem apparent than since Universal cannot be made a
party on the law side, this case should be transferred to
chancery."GO
46 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, § 34 (1931).
47 122 W. Va. 671, 13 S.E.2d 15 (1940).
48 Syl.
49 123 W. Va. 522, 16 S.E.2d 924 (1941).
50 Id. at 526, 16 S.E.2d at 926.
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This case ignores the common law rule, unchanged by statute
in this state, that when one who is a proper coplaintiff refuses to
join, the one who desires to sue may make him a party plaintiff
without his consent. The rule is thus stated in Sunderland's Cases
on Common Law Pleading,51 quoting from Dicey on Parties:
"One of two coplaintiffs has a right to bring an action in
the name of both, nor has the court any power to interfere,
unless the coplaintiff's name be used, not only against his will,
but fraudulently .... But a coplaintiff whose name is used
without permission is not without protection. 1st. He may
obtain an indemnity against costs from the party who makes
use of his name: i.e., he may apply to the court to have such
party's proceedings stayed until he gives security for costs.
2nd. He may release or settle the action. Any one of several
coplaintiffs may give the defendant a release from the action,
which is good, and may be pleaded, unless it is fraudulent."
Punitive or exemplary damages. The cases are not in accord
as to the necessity or manner of pleading punitive or exemplary
damages 2 - According to Mr. Chitty, if the matter alleged in aggra-
vation does not constitute within itself a distinct cause of action,
it is sufficient to allege that the defendant did other wrongs (alia
enormia) to the plaintiff, without being more specific. For example,
in trespass quare clausum, under the allegation of alia enormia,
the plaintiff might prove that his servant was beaten in order to
aggravate the trespass to the land; but he would not be permitted
to prove the value of services lost because of the beating, without
a specific allegation, because such damages would pertain to a
separate and distinct cause of action.5 3  A West Virginia statute
dispenses with the necessity of alleging even alia enormia.
"In actions of trespass on the case, where the action of
trespass would formerly have been proper, general averments
that the defendant committed other wrongs, and that the acts
charged were done with force and arms against the peace, may
be omitted; and the plaintiff may prove all that he could have
proved if such averments had been inserted in the declara-
tion."54
It would seem that, through the operation of this statute upon
the common law as stated on the authority of Mr. Chitty above, it
would be proper in this state to prove matters in aggravation (which
constitute the basis for punitive or exemplary damages) without
51 At 622 (2d ed. 1932).
= See 15 A~f. JUR. 766-7 (1938); 25 C.J.S. 757-9 (1941).
r 1 CHrTrY, PLEADING 517-518 (16th ed. 1882).
5 AV. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 13 (1931).
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any allegation at all in the declaration therefor, as long as the
matters proved did not constitute an independent cause of action.
However, in O'Brien v. Snodgrass,5 the court reached a contrary
conclusion. The pleading requirements are set forth in the following
language:
"There can be no recovery of punitive or exemplary dam-
ages, unless they are claimed eo nomine in the declaration, or
the wrong pleaded therein is alleged to have been done wilfully,
maliciously, wantonly or in some other like aggravated manner,
or unless facts are pleaded from which the court can see that a
jury may legally conclude therefrom that the tort was so
committed."56
Necessity of pleading matters in the nature of recoupment. In
actions of debt on simple contracts and of assumpsit the scope of the
general issues, nil debet and non assumpsit, is very broad. It has
repeatedly been said in Virginia and West Virginia cases that, at
the common law, which prevails in these states, all defenses may be
asserted under these general issues except the statute of limitations,
bankruptcy and tender. 7 This would mean, of course, that recoup-
ment, failure of consideration, partial failure of consideration
(which is a species of recoupment), or fraud in procurement of a
contract sued upon could be proved without being specially
pleaded. In fact, it has been held that matter in recoupment, since
it operates merely in reduction of damages, cannot be specially
pleaded but must be asserted in pursuance of a notice accompanying
the general issue. Apparently the first departure from these proposi-
tions came in Attorneys' National Clearing House v. Greever/8
where the court summarizes its holding in the following language:
"In an action on a contract a defense of failure or partial
failure of consideration must be grounded on a special plea
which fairly puts the plaintiff on notice of that defense."' 5
The only authority cited for this proposition is a section in the
Code which reads as follows:
"In any action on a contract, the defendant may file a plea
alleging any such failure in the consideration of the contract,
or fraud in its procurement, or any such breach of warranty to
him of the title to real property or the soundness of personal
property, for the price or value whereof he entered into the
contract, or any other matter, as would entitle him to recover
damages at law from the plaintiff, or the person under whom
55 123 W. Va. 483, 16 S.E.2d 621 (1941).
56 Syl. 2.
57 Davis v. Davis Trust Co., 114 W. Va. 635, 645, 173 S.E. 266, 270 (1934).
58 121 W. Va. 601, 5 S.E2d 621 (1939).
59 Syl. 1.
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the plaintiff claims .... Every such plea shall be verified by
affidavit."60
A section following this section in the same article provides
that the defendant, when his proof under such a plea so warrants,
may recover an excess over the plaintiffs claim.01
In pursuance of the construction placed upon this statute by
the present case, it would seem necessary to resort to a special plea
under oath in all cases where the defendant relies upon total or
partial failure of consideration, fraud in procurement of a contract,
breach of warranty, or recoupment in general, whether or not the
defendant is attempting to recover an excess over or merely to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery, since the statute on which the deci-
sion is based, by specific or general language, covers all these matters
with equal force. Such a result is entirely contrary to the object of
the statute as expounded in the earlier Virginia and West Virginia
cases, and particularly as explained by the Virginia text writers.
The view heretofore has been that the statute never was intended to
encroach upon common law methods of defense, where the defend-
ant seeks merely to reduce (even to obliteration) the plaintiff's
claim, which is all that he can do under common law recoupment,
but was intended to provide a method of pleading whereby the
defendant may not only reduce the plaintiff's recovery but may
recover an excess over.
62
Necessity of pleading the statute of frauds. It has been held
unqualifiedly in several West Virginia cases that a defense based
on the statute of frauds may be asserted under the general issues
nil debet and non assumpsit.6 3 In Jones v. Shipley,64 apparently
for the first time, it is suggested, by way of dictum, that the statute
should be pleaded specially when the declaration on its face shows
that the contract declared upon is oral; but that when the declara-
tion is silent as to the form of the contract, the defense may be
asserted under the general issue. In this case, the declaration dis-
closed an oral contract, but since no objection was interposed in
the trial court to assertion of the defense under the general issue, it
was held that the procedure could not be questioned on the writ
of error. The cases cited to sustain the dictum are equity cases,
60 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 5, § 5 (1931).
61 IV. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 9 (1931).
62 See 47 W. VA. L.Q. 166-177 (1941) for a more comprehensive discussion
and citation of authorities.
63 McClanahan v. Otto-Marmet Coal & Mining Co., 74 W.Va. 543, 82 S.E.
752 (1914); Roberts v. Bowers, 99 W. Va. 215, 128 S.E. 99 (1925).
64 122 W. Va. 65, 7 S.E.2d 346 (1940).
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where the problem has some peculiar aspects, and are not very
satisfactory precedents for establishing a common law rule.05
COMMON LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Alternate jurors. For the first time in West Virginia the prac-
tice, somewhat common in other states, of using alternate jurors was
authorized in 1949. 61 The practice is limited to felony cases and is
discretionary with the court-"Whenever, in the opinion of the
court, the trial is likely to be a protracted one." The number of
alternates is limited to four.
Number of jurors required on panel. In a felony case, a
statute requires a panel of twenty qualified jurors to be placed in
the box, upon whom peremptory challenges may be exercised.17
Such has normally been the practice in misdemeanor and civil
cases, although no statute specifically so requires. However, the
statute s prescribing the number of peremptory challenges to which
each party is entitled in such cases would require twenty unless a
challenge or challenges were waived.
In State v. Melanakis,69 a misdemeanor case, only seventeen
qualified jurors were available. The State, in order to expedite the
trial, agreed to dispense with three of its peremptory challenges in
order that the defendant might have his legal quota of four. Over
objection by the defendant, a jury was so selected. The Supreme
Court of Appeals held that there was no error. However, the court
emphasizes the fact that the case was tried before the court rule0
went into effect requiring the clerk in any case to place twenty
qualified jurors in the box, "or such number less than twenty (20)
as may be agreed upon by the parties." Apparently, under this
rule, any deviation from the prescribed number would require
the consent of both parties, regardless of the fact that a party
refusing to consent should be offered his full quota of challenges.
Stating grounds of objections to instructions. One of the first
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals for the regula-
tion of trial practice required specific grounds to be stated for
objections to instructions to a jury.
65 For a more comprehensive discussion of this subject and citation of ad-
ditional West Virginia cases and cases from other states, see 47 AV. VA. L.Q.
177-183 (1941).
6 W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 36.
87 W. VA. CoDE c. 62, art. 3, § 3 (1931).
68 Id. at c. 56, art. 6, § 12 (1931).
69 129 W. Va. 317, 40 S.E.2d 314 (1946).
70 See 127 W. Va. Reports.
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"Objections, if any, to each instruction shall be made
when the same is offered; specific grounds of objection only will
be considered."'71
Although the rule itself neither states nor implies any exception
to its application, the court held in State v. Belcher7 2 that it does
not apply to felony cases. In a later case,7 3 the court refused to
extend the exception to misdemeanor cases. The final result is
that grounds for objections to instructions must be stated specifically
in civil and misdemeanor cases but need not be stated in felony
cases.
Impeachment of verdict by juror. It has repeatedly been held
in this state that an affidavit or testimony of a juror cannot be
received to impeach his verdict. This inhibition is based on the
broad ground of public policy and applies alike to matters involving
the mental state of the juror and to things which occur inside and
outside the jury room.7 4 On the same principle, it has been held
that even before the verdict has been finally accepted by the court
and the jury discharged, it is improper for the court to inquire, by
way of polling the jury, whether the verdict was improperly found
by the quotient method.7 5 If a juror cannot impeach his verdict
by his own direct testimony, it would seem equally, or even more,
objectionable to permit his verdict to be impeached by proof of
statements made by him in public after the trial, which was done
in a recent case.7 6  In this case, a young negro woman had been
convicted of first degree murder without recommendation. The
chief ground of reversal was the fact that three disinterested wit-
nesses testified that one of the jurors stated in a public place that
he voted for conviction because the defendant was a negro.
New trial involving weight of conflicting oral testimony. It
seems to have been practically the universal holding in numerous
'West Virginia cases, both early and late, that the jury is the sole
judge of the credibility of witnesses and that, therefore, the court
will not disturb a verdict based wholly on conflicting oral evidence,
71 Rule 6(e), 116 W. Va. Reports.
7- 121 IV. Va. 170, 2 S.E.2d 257 (1939).
73 State v. McMillion, 127 W. Va. 197, 32 S.E.2d 625 (1944).
74 State v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310 (1895); Pickens v. Coal
River Boom & Timber Co., 58 W. Va. 11, 50 S.E. 872, 6 Am. Cas. 285 (1905);
Graziani v. Fimple, 110 W. Va. 383, 158 S.E. 658 (1931).
75 Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W. Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d
400 (1941).
76 State v. Dean, 58 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1950).
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regardless of an apparent preponderance against it.7 In Burgess v.
Gilchrist,78 decided in 1941, the court seems to have departed from
this rule. The verdict was set aside as contrary to a plain pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Apparently the court might have
brought its decision into line with prior decisions by noting the
fact that the preponderance of conflicting oral evidence which it
thought was contrary to the verdict was supplemented by uncontro-
verted facts and circumstances.7 9 However, although aware of the
rule which had prevailed and the cases sustaining it, the court
seemingly takes pains to indicate that it is not bound by it and
purports to set the verdict aside wholly on a preponderance of con-
flicting oral testimony.
Making evidence part of the record. Following the English
Statute of Westminster as a precedent, the Legislature in this state
has prescribed a bill of exceptions as a mechanism to bring the
evidence into the record for purposes of review in a common law
action. Like its English predecessor, the West Virginia statute
indulges in a complexity of formal requirements. Not only must
the bill itself be fully authenticated by the certificate and signature
of the trial judge, but, in addition thereto, it finally must be made
a part of the record by an order of the court or of the judge in
vacation.80 Failure to comply with this latter requirement has
more than once rendered abortive an attempt to seek appellate
review of the evidence in a case.8'
In order to eliminate this seemingly superfluous formality and
provide a simple method for authenticating matters not per se parts
of the record, including the evidence, a section was enacted in the
Revised Code in 19318-2 which provides simply for a certification
over the signature of the trial judge, without any further formality,
for the purpose of making anything a part of the record. However,
following the policy of the Virginia Legislature, from whose enact-
ment the section was taken substantially intact, the Revisers and
the West Virginia Legislature, for the benefit of those who do not
desire to learn new methods, left in the Code the old section13
77 Coalmer v. Barrett, 61 W. Va. 237, 56 S.E. 385 (1907). This is a typical
case among numerous others, earlier and later.
78 123 W. Va. 727, 17 S.E.2d 804 (1941).
79 See Coalmer v. Barrett, 61 W. Va. 237, 56 S.E. 385 (1907); Hetzel
v. Kemper, 102 W. Va. 567, 135 S.E. 667 (1926).
so See Carlin, A Modern Substitute for Bills of Exceptions, 25 W. VA.
L.Q. 198 (1918).
81 See Monongahela Ry. v. Wilson, 122 W. Va. 467, 10 S.E.2d 795 (1940).
82' W. VA. CODE c. 56, -art. 6, § 36 (1931).
88 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, § 35 (1931).
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providing for bills of exceptions and calling for court orders to
make the bills parts of the record. The confusion that may result
from this act of generosity is well exemplified in a recent case.
In this case, Perkins v. Hanna,84 the plaintiff in error appar-
ently attempted to bring the evidence into the record by a bill of
exceptions, but no court order was entered making the bill a part
of the record. It apparently was conceded that the bill itself con-
tained a sufficient certification, signed by the judge, to satisfy the
new section which dispenses with a court order, if the plaintiff in
error had been attempting to pursue the method prescribed by that
section; but the court held that, since the instrument was labeled a
bill of exceptions and contained language identifying it as a bill
of exceptions, it was apparent that the plaintiff in error was attempt-
ing to resort to a bill of exceptions and the absence of a court order
was fatal. Judge Rose wrote a strong dissenting opinion, in which
Judge Fox concurred, arguing that to impose the requirement of
a court order under the circumstances was to adhere to the very
formality and technicality which the new section was intended to
eliminate. In 1950, Perkins v. Hanna and State v. Leadman, in
accord, are overruled by Porter v. Woodard,8 4a which adopts the
dissenting view in Perkins v. Hanna, with Judges Riley and Lovins
dissenting.
EQUITY PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
Allegations as to rents, issues and profits in a creditors' bill. A
recent case, Central Trust Co. v. Feamster,85 dispenses with the
necessity of an allegation which is usually found in bills to enforce
judgment liens and which appears in forms in local texts. The
allegation is that the rents, issues and profits from the judgment'
debtor's lands will not be sufficient to discharge the lien debts within
five years and is inserted in pursuance of a section in the Code88
which provides for a sale of the realty on the condition that the
lien debts cannot be so discharged. The court says, "This is a
matter of law, not of pleading."
Limitation on time for reviving equity suit. A section in the
Code87 provides for revivor of suits in equity by scire facias or
84 127 w. Va. 527, 34 S.E.2d 7 (1945); accord, State v. Leadman, 131 W. Va.
387, 48 S.E.2d 663 (1941).84a Porter v. Woodard, 60 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1950).
85 123 W. Va. 250, 14 S.E.2d 619 (1941).
so W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 3, § 9 (1931).
87 Id. at c. 56, art. 8, § 5.
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motion. It has been held that the provisions of this section have
not superseded the equity method of revivor by a bill of revivor,
but have merely prescribed supplementary methods of procedure.
Another section provides that, whenever it shall be necessary to
revive a suit because of death of a party or any other event, if the
party seeking the revivor
".... shall not make such motion or apply for such scire facias
at or before the second term of the court next after that at
which there may have been a suggestion on the record of the
fact making such scire facias or motion proper, the suit of such
plaintiff or appellant shall be discontinued, unless good cause
be shown to the contrary."""
It will be noted that the limitation prescribed by the quoted
provision, in words, applies only to a revivor by motion or scire
facias, and places no time limitation upon the equity method of
revivor by a bill of revivor. In Dankmer v. City Ice 8 Fuel Co., 9
it is held that the limitation prescribed by the statute applies by
analogy to revivor by a bill of revivor. Otherwise, of course, the
effect of the statute could be wholly obviated merely by resort to a
bill of revivor in lieu of a motion or scire facias.
Time for filing answer after plea or demurrer overruled. A
section in the Code provides that, when a plea or demurrer to a
bill in equity is overruled,
".... the defendant shall file his answer, in court, if in session,
or, if not in session, in the clerk's office of the court in which the
suit is pending, within fifteen days after the overruling of his
plea or demurrer, unless, for good cause shown, the time is
enlarged by the court, or the judge thereof in vacation."0
A matter as to which the statute is silent is whether, if the time is
enlarged by the court, the extension can be granted after expiration
of the fifteen days. Several cases dealing with the statute under
varying circumstances have held that the extension may be granted
after expiration of the fifteen days.9 1 In a later case, the court
expresses a contrary view, making the following statement:
"Under the provisions of Code, 56-4-56, a trial chancellor
cannot enlarge the time for filing answer to a bill of complaint
after demurrer or plea thereto has been overruled, unless
88.Id. at c. 56, art. 8, § 8.
89 123 W. Va. 492, 17 S.E.2d 441 (1941).
90 W. VA. CoDE: c. 56, art. 4, § 56 (1931).
91 Carleton Mining & Power Co. v. West Virginia Northern R.R., 113
W. Va. 20, 166 S.E. 536 (1932); Altmeyer v. Fassig, 114 W. Va. 266, 171 S.E.
529 (1933).
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motion for such enlargement is made within fifteen days from
the entry of the order overruling the demurrer or plea."92
No mention is made in this case of the prior cases which it over-
rules. However, in a still later case, 93 the interpretation of the
statute adopted in the case quoted above is approved and prior
cases to the contrary are cited and expressly overruled. Conse-
quently, as the law now stands, a defendant must take care to file
his answer within fifteen days from the time when his demurrer
or plea is overruled unless he secures an extension of the time
within that period.9 4
Necessity of process on answer in equity claiming affirmative
relief. It seems to be conceded by all authorities in this state that,
when a defendant in equity resorts to a cross bill for the purpose
of seeking affirmative relief, process must issue against all defendants
in the cross bill, regardless of whether they are plaintiffs or defend-
ants in the original bill. If, in pursuance of the statute so pro-
viding, the affirmative relief is sought in an answer in lieu of a cross
bill, the extent to which process is necessary is not quite so clear.
In Goff v. Price,9  and possibly some other cases, it is said that
process must issue on the answer against all parties to the original
bill except the plaintiffs therein. In two comparatively recent
cases," a contrary view has been taken, the court holding that on
an answer seeking affirmative relief, the same as in the case of a
cross bill, process must issue against all parties, whether plaintiffs
or defendants in the original bill.97
Reversal of partition decree. In Hale v. Thacker,9s the court,
seemingly actuated by general considerations of public policy and
its view of the sanctity of real property, seems to have indulged in
an unusual measure of generosity to an appellant seeking reversal
of a partition decree. In this case, the commissioners for partition
reported that "the parties in said cause would be best served by
selling said land," but did not report, as required by statute in
92 Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547 (1942).
93 Strachan v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 W. Va. 692, 44 S.E.2d 845 (1947).
94 A more comprehensive discussion of this subject, including additional
phases of interpretation of the statute and citation of cases, will be found in
40 W. VA. L.Q. 360-368 (1934).
or 42 W. Va. 384, 26 S.E. 287 (1896).96 Meadow River Lumber Co. v. Easley, 122 W. Va. 184, 7 S.E.2d 864
(1940); Central Trust Co. v. Feamster, 123 W. Va. 250, 14 S.E.2d 619 (1941).
97 A more comprehensive discussion of this subject, including an evalu-
ation of the West Virginia decisions and holdings in other states, will be found
in 47 W. VA. L.Q. 183-190 (1941).
98 122 W. Va. 648, 12 S.E.2d 524 (1940).
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order to warrant a sale,99 that partition in kind could not be "con-
veniently made." The report was not excepted to, but it was held
that the error was not waived by failing to except and could be
asserted for the first time in the appellate court. It is conceded that
the error did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and hence
that the decree was not void; also, that ordinarily error in a com-
missioner's report cannot be relied upon in the appellate court in
the absence of exceptions in the lower court; but an exception is
made in this case because partition in kind is "of such a funda-
mental nature" and "a fundamental rule of law affecting the owner-
ship of real property is involved."
Power of divorce commissioner to recommend granting or re-
fusal of divorce. In Currance v. Currance,100 the court in effect
held that, when a divorce case was referred to a commissioner in
chancery under the statute then in effect, 01 the commissioner was
authorized to report only the evidence and findings of facts and
was wholly without authority to advise the court that a divorce
should or should not be granted. Presumably as a result of this
decision, the statute was amended at the legislative session of 1945
so as to permit the commissioner to make such recommendation .10 2
The proper forum for contempt proceedings. Since the case
of Smith v. Smith'0 3 was decided in 1918, the West Virginia court
has recognized the distinction between civil and criminal contempts
resulting from disobedience of an equity decree-ordinarily an
injunction order, but in this case a decree for the payment of ali-
' mony. The distinction is important as determining whether the
' ntempt proceeding will be prosecuted on the equity side of the
c6jjrt, as a phase of the procedure in the suit in which the decree
wasrendered, or on the law side of the court as a criminal pro-
ceediflg; the rights and immunities of the contemnor depending
upon the nature of the proceeding. For instance, if the proceeding
is prosec'4ed on the law side as a criminal proceeding, the con-
temnor can'ot be compelled to testify against himself, can be con-
victed only dhievidence of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
in other respects is treated as a defendant prosecuted for crime;
advantages whi.ct he would not have if the proceeding were civil
in nature. In general, although the dividing line is not distinct,
99 W. VA. CODE c., 37 art. 4, § 3 (1931).
100 123 W. Va. 599, .4S.E.2d 656 (1941).
101 W. VA. CODE c. 48, rt. 2, § 26 (1931).
102 W. Va. Acts 1945, c. 47,
103 81 W. Va. 761, 95 SE. iQI. (1918).
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if the object of the proceeding is to vindicate the court whose
decree has been disobeyed by way of punishing the contemnor for
his disobedience, the proceeding is criminal in its nature and must
be conducted on the law side of the court; but if the object is pri-
marily to secure performance of the decree for the benefit of a
party, it is civil in its nature and may be conducted on the equity
side in the suit in which the decree was rendered. In view of these
distinctions, it may be somewhat surprising that the West Virginia
court has lately held 0 4 that trial of a criminal contempt on the
equity side of the court is not reversible error, stating its conclusion
as follows:
"A chancery court has jurisdiction of civil contempts com-
mitted therein; but in respect to a proceeding to punish for a
criminal contempt, whether or not committed in a chancery
cause, the matter should be docketed and heard on the law side
of the court. But the entry of a punitive order on the chancery
side is not reversible error.105
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
Method of attacking sufficiency of notice. In a proceeding by
notice of motion for judgment, the notice, like a summons in un-
lawful detainer, serves the dual function of process and pleading.
Strictly, if it is defective as process, it should be attacked by a
motion to quash; but if defective as a pleading, by a demurrer.
However, as might have been expected because of the liberality
with which this statutory remedy has been treated, the court has
refused to make a technical distinction between the two different
methods of attack.
"A notice of motion for judgment serves as the summons
and declaration in the action, and defects appearing on the
face thereof may be taken advantage of either by motion to
quash or by demurrer; and a motion to quash may be treated
as a demurrer."' 10 6
Exhibits cannot be filed with notice. It is fundamental law,
in the absence of a statute, that an exhibit cannot be filed with a
pleading in a common law action and become a part thereof, as in
equity; 1''7 the common law method of making an extraneous paper
a part of a pleading being to crave oyer of it, in those instances
where oyer is permitted. A proceeding by notice of motion for
104 Hallam v. Alpha Coal Corp., 122 W. Va. 454, 9 S.E.2d 818 (1940).
105 Syl. 4.
"'O Kitson v. Messenger, 126 W. Va. 60, Syl. 1, 27 S.E.2d 265 (1943).
107 Riley v. Yoit, 58 W. Va. 213, 52 S.E. 528 (1905).
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judgment is conducted on the law side of the court and, to the
extent that it is not regulated by statute, it treated as having the
attributes of a common law action. Nevertheless, in Mountain
State Water Co. v. Kingwood 08 the majority of the court held that
it is proper to file an exhibit with the notice, being influenced
perhaps by the general informality with which the proceeding has
been treated. A few years later, this holding was reversed and, as
the law is now, exhibits cannot be filed with the notice.0 0
GARNISHMENT
Plaintiff as garnishee. The authorities are about equally
divided as to whether a plaintiff in attachment may designate him-
self as a garnishee; in other words, whether he may be both plain-
tiff and garnishee in the same action. 10 The question seems to have
come before the West Virginia court for decision in only one case,
decided in 1942.111 Although the court recognizes that the un-
qualified language of the statute defining garnishees"1 2 is broad
enough to include a plaintiff, it still could not persuade itself to
accede to such a practice. The fact is emphasized that the case
involved a foreign attachment, in which the defendant was pro-
ceeded against by an order of publication, and that the court had
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant; from which it may be
surmised that the court might have taken a different view if the
defendant had been personally served with process, therefore knew
in general what was going on, and did not have to rely wholly upon
the garnishee to notify him that his property had been attached.
However, the decision is based on such broad considierations of
policy that it is doubtful whether an exception would have been
recognized.
COURT RULES
The rules constituting the subject matter of this topic are
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals for the regula-
tion of procedure in trial courts. Only those becoming effective
within the last decade are noted.
Joinder of actions against several insurers. A rule appears in
volume 125 of the West Virginia Reports which is designed to
108 121 W. Va. 66, 1 S.E.2d 395 (1989).
109 Beckley v. Craighead, 125 W. Va. 484, 24 S.E.2d 908 (1943).
110 4 Am. JuR. 639 (1936).
111 Emery v. C. D. Beck & Co., 124 W. Va. 766, 22 S.E.2nd 458 (1942).
112 W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 7, § 15 (1931).
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dispense with the necessity for separate actions against several
insurers which have issued separate policies covering the same
risk, when the policies contain similar, or substantially similar,
terms and conditions and have the same legal effect as to liability;
a situation which will most frequently occur in the case of fire
insurance policies, particularly as a result of the standard form
prescribed by statute. The insured may, at his election, join all
such insurers in a single action, or he may sue them separately as
heretofore. The declaration must contain a separate count against
each defendant but the issues are all to be tried together. The
defendants are collectively entitled to four peremptory challenges
of jurors. The form of the verdict or verdicts is to be prescribed
by the court, and the court is empowered to prescribe the order
of the opening statements, submission of evidence and closing
arguments, unless the defendants shall agree upon these matters.
"If the verdict is in general form and favor of the plaintiff, the
court shall apportion the amount of the verdict in entering judg-
ment, direct the amount of recovery against each defendant." The
court is also given a discretion to determine preliminarily the pro-
priety of the joinder and to prescribe a separate trial for any de-
fendant where it appears that the cause of action against such
defendant is substantially different from that against other de-
fendants.
Consolidation of actions in negligence cases. Another rule,
also appearing in volume 125 of the West Virginia Reports, pro-
vides for consolidation of cross actions in negligence cases. It is
particularly designed for the purpose of determining the rights
and liabilities of persons involved in motor vehicle collisions,
although broad enough to cover other situations. The typical
situation is where two automobiles collide and the driver of each
claims that the other was at fault. In such a situation, if one of
the parties sues and obtains a judgment in his favor, the other
party will be concluded from seeking a judgment by the principle
of res judicata. It has been reported that persons have attempted
to take advantage of this possibility, when they realized that they
were at fault, by suing before a justice of the peace for an amount
below the limit of appealability, with the hope that by some
strategy they might obtain a recovery and so prevent the persons
really entitled to a recovery from recovering in a court of record.
In such a situation, there would be no opportunity to vacate the
judgment of the justice and it would operate by way of res judicata
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to prevent a subsequent recovery by the other party of a judgment
in his favor in a court of record. The possibilities of such a result
are enhanced by the fact that a judgment may be obtained so much
more quickly before a justice than in a court of record, and be-
cause the party entitled to a recovery is often entitled to an amount
beyond the jurisdiction of a justice, and so does not desire to sub-
mit his case to such a tribunal, even if he were willing to subject
himself to the hazards of a race for judgment.
The rule and the procedure prescribed by it are somewhat
complicated and no attempt will be made here to go into details.
The gist of the remedial effect may be gleaned from the first
paragraph, which reads as follows:
"In any action at law, when such action is based on
negligence, the court shall inquire whether or not another
action is pending based on the same occurrence wherein
defendant in the first action is plaintiff and plaintiff in the
first action is defendant; and, if it appear that such other
action is pending in the same court, the court shall order a
consolidation of the two actions."
Then follow provisions for consolidation when the two actions
are pending in different courts of record of the same state and
prescribing the venue. Further provisions provide for consolida-
tion, under certain circumstances, where one of the actions is
pending in a federal court or in a court of another state. Consti-
tutional considerations prevented provision for consolidation when
one of the actions is pending in a court of record and the other
before a justice of the peace, but the difficulty is circumvented by a
provision that a judgment before a justice for an amount less than
fifteen dollars shall not be res judicata, and a further provision
that on an appeal from a justice a consolidation may then be
ordered.
Time of amendment after demurrer sustained. A section in
the Code has provided that, when a demurrer has been sustained
to a declaration or bill, an amended declaration or bill may be
filed "at any time within the term at which the demurrer was
sustained."113 Complaint has been made that demurrers have been
sustained so near the end of a term of court that plaintiffs did not
have time to file amended declarations or bills. Consequently, a
rule, which in effect is an amendment of the Code section, has been
adopted which permits the court to extend the time for amend-
ment not to exceed thirty days after the adjournment of the term.
113 Id. at c. 56, art. 4, § 26 (1931).
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This rule will be found in volume 127 of the West Virginia
Reports.
Selection of jurors. No statute has prescribed the manner in
which jurors shall be selected for trial of a case. Consequently,
various methods have prevailed in the trial courts of the state,
some of which have fallen far short of the supposed requirement
that the jurors shall be selected by lot. A rule appearing in volume
127 of the West Virginia Reports prescribes for all trial courts a
method of selection by lot which approximates methods already
prevailing in some of the trial courts.
Pretrial procedure. This important modern device, designed
for the purpose of simplifying the issues and eliminating super-
fluous proof by informal collaboration of the court and counsel
prior to trial, was adopted by a rule which appears in detail in
volume 127 of the West Virginia Reports.
Declaratory judgment procedure. The uniform declaratory
judgment act was adopted in this state in 1941.114 The act is con-
fined largely to specification of instances where the procedure may
be used and is lacking in procedural details. Due, perhaps, to the
fact that it was primarily designed for operation in states where
common law pleading and practice and equity pleading and pro-
cedure have been superseded by practice codes, no provision is
made for any procedure that would reconcile or supersede the
two traditional systems. As a consequence, practitioners in this
state have been in doubt as to the proper procedure to pursue.
The nature of the remedy, particularly if an equitable right is
involved, would suggest something analogous to equity pleading
and procedure; but any procedure adequate to deal with a legal
matter would necessarily be mostly foreign to common law forms
and precedents. In 1947, a rule was promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals"- which prescribes a uniform procedure based
on equity standards, which are most amenable to demands of the
remedy. It reads in part as follows:
"All pleadings in such proceeding shall conform, as to
form, to the requirements of pleadings in suits in equity, shall
be deemed to be equitable in character, and recorded in the
chancery order book. The court shall hear and determine
the matters in controversy as in suits in equity, except that
any party shall have the right to a trial by jury of any disputed
question of fact as to which he is entitled to a trial by jury
114 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 13 (Michie, 1949).
11r 128 W. Va. XV.
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under existing law, and such verdict shall have such binding
effect as it would have under existing law at law and in equity
respectively."
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